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ABSTRACT
Voice-based virtual personal assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa
or Google Assistant have become highly popular and are used for
diverse daily tasks ranging from querying on-line information,
shopping, smart home control and a variety of enterprise applica-
tion scenarios1. Capabilities of virtual assistants can be enhanced
with so-called Skills, i.e., programmatic extensions that allow third-
party providers to integrate their services with the respective voice
assistant.
In this paper, we show that specially crafted malicious Skills can
use the seemingly limited Skill interaction model to cause harm. We
present novel man-in-the-middle attacks against benign Skills and
Virtual Assistant functionalities. Our attack uses loopholes in the
Skill interface to redirect a victim’s voice input to a malicious Skill,
thereby hijacking the conversation between Alexa and the victim.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first man-in-the-middle
attack targeting the Skill ecosystem. We present the design of our
attack and demonstrate its feasibility based on a proof-of-concept
implementation attacking the Alexa Skills of a smart lock as well
as a home security system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Personal voice-controlled virtual assistants are getting more and
more popular and ubiquitous. There are numerous virtual assistants
available on the market from different vendors like, e.g., Amazon
Alexa, Google Assistant, Apple Siri and Microsoft Cortana. Virtual
assistants can be integrated into other programs, built into OSs or
into IoT devices like smart speakers, smart watches, appliances,
cars or even clothing.
1https://aws.amazon.com/alexaforbusiness/
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Recently, multiple new attacks against devices utilizing voice
control-based UIs have emerged, mainly focused on issuing unau-
thorized commands without the legitimate user noticing this. The
attacks typically utilize synthesized [1, 6], obfuscated [3, 21], embed-
ded [16, 24] or ultrasound-modulated voice commands [13, 19, 25].
Besides sound, also other attack vectors exist, e.g., using electro-
magnetic interference [10] or attacks leveraging the headphone
jack of a device [23]. There are also attacks exploiting the way we
pronounce words to invoke a similar sounding Skill [12, 26].
What makes the voice-control interface of virtual assistants par-
ticularly interesting is that it can be augmented with various third-
party service applications, called ’Skills’, or ’Actions’ that provide
extended functionality beyond the basic functions of the virtual
assistant, like, e.g., the possibility to control smart home appliances,
or, access to specific information services. It is obvious that by mis-
using such ’Skills’ an adversary could potentially cause much harm
to the user. Therefore the interaction model of Skills is very limited:
Skills can only be used to retrieve information from a third-party
service or invoke actions explicitly exposed by the service.
Our goals and contributions. In this paper, we show that care-
fully crafted malicious back-end Skill functionality can be com-
bined with known inaudible attack techniques to circumvent the
seemingly limited Skill interaction model of a virtual assistant like
Amazon Alexa to allow an adversary to arbitrarily control and ma-
nipulate interactions between the user and other benign Skills. We
present a man-in-the-middle attack that completely hijacks a full
conversation between a voice-controlled virtual assistant and the
targeted user and is very hard to detect. The advantage of our ap-
proach using a malicious back-end Skill for the attack is that it
works in the context of an active user interaction with the virtual
assistant, completelymaintaining the interaction semantics from the
user’s perspective. This allows the adversary to launch much more
powerful attacks than simple command injection as presented in
earlier work [3, 14, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25].
In our attack the adversary can arbitrarily modify the virtual
assistant’s responses, or, can entirely replace its functionality by
her own, returning any responses of her choice to the victim that
seem to be coming from genuine personal virtual assistant. Further-
more, our attack can make the responses seem plausible even to a
suspicious and particularly vigilant user by maliciously modifying
genuine, plausible data provided by benign Skills on-the-fly. With
this Proof-of-Concept we show that designers of voice controlled
applications in Skill ecosystems must take inaudible injection and
jamming attacks into account.
To implement our attack we tackle a number of technical chal-
lenges: (1) How to capture user commands and redirect them to
a malicious Skill so that the original intention of the user is over-
ridden? (2) How to exfiltrate genuine information from legitimate
Skills so that it can be used to form fabricated responses to the
user that seem plausible? (3) Finally, how to orchestrate the tech-
nical components required by the attack seamlessly together to
create the illusion that the user is conversing with the legitimate
Alexa functionality or Skills, while it in reality is interacting with a
malicious Skill.
Contributions Our main contributions are as follows:
• We present Lyexa, the (to the best of our knowledge) first
man-in-the-middle attack against personal virtual assistants
(Sect. 3).
• The implementation of a malicious Skill framework that can
convincingly impersonate the behavior of virtual assistants
and benign Skills associated with it, while simultaneously
being able tomodify this behavior as desired by the adversary
(Sect. 4).
• AProof-of-concept evaluation of the Lyexa attack framework
in different rooms and environments, on two smart home
security systems and the 10 top Skills of the U.S. Skill store
controlled by an Amazon Echo Dot virtual assistant device
(Sect. 5).
In this paper, we focus on the most popular virtual assistant, i.e.,
Amazon Alexa. However, we stress that our attack can be modified
to cover also other similar virtual assistants from other vendors in
a similar fashion. The implementation of the attack components is
described in Sect. 4, and suggestions for countermeasures against
this attack are given in Sect. 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
The most popular voice-controlled virtual assistant utilising a smart
speaker device placed in users’ homes is Alexa2, short for Alexa
Voice Service (AVS), from Amazon, with a market share of ca. 70%
in US households in 2018. [11]Typically Alexa is integrated into a
smart speaker device like the Amazon Echo or its smaller variant
Amazon Echo Dot. A similar set-up applies also to Google’s compa-
rable service, the Google Assistant. These smart speaker devices are
equipped with microphones and loudspeakers in order to facilitate
voice-based interaction with the user of the device. As shown in
Fig. 1 users issue voice commands to their virtual assistants by
uttering a so called wake word like “Alexa”, or, “Ok, Google”. When
the corresponding smart speaker recognizes the wake word, it starts
recording audio to capture any subsequent commands given by
the user (1). The recorded audio is forwarded to the corresponding
back-end service like Amazon Voice Service or Google Assistant for
speech-to-text translation (2). Depending on the issued commands,
the back-end service will look up information or initiate actions (3)
and respond with a reply (4) that the smart speaker will play back
to the user (5).
In addition to this basic usage scenario, virtual assistant function-
ality can also be built into dedicated third-party devices. Examples
2https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Echo-And-Alexa-Devices/b?node=9818047011
User gives a
command
Alexa recognizes
the used Skill
name and sends
the request to the
Skill's backend
The backend
processes the
request and
returns a textual
response
Alexa converts
the response to
audio (TTS) and
streams it to the
device
The user hears
the response with
Alexa's voice
1 2 3
5 4
Amazon Voice
ServiceUser Third Party
Figure 1: User interaction flow while using a Skill
include BMW cars3, where Alexa is able to control the air condi-
tioning system of the car, or, LG ThinQ Smart fridges and ovens4
where Alexa can for instance be used to preheat the oven.
2.1 Skills and Actions
The functionality of Alexa can be extended by so-called Skills5
(called Actions6 in Google Assistant). These are third-party ser-
vice plug-ins that extend the virtual assistant’s functionality and
allow it to interact with third-party services, generating an entire
ecosystem around AVS. Any developer (private or organization)
can develop Skills free of charge. Examples of third-party Skills in-
clude, e.g., ordering pizza through Domino’s Pizza Skill or calling a
Uber ride through Uber’s Skill, to name a few. Utilizing appropriate
Skills, Alexa can also be used for controlling user’s smart home IoT
devices given that the manufacturers of these devices provide the
appropriate Skill for controlling them through Alexa.
In contrast to apps on popular smartphone platforms like An-
droid or iOS, which are essentially pieces of software running on the
host smartphone, Skills are different. They don’t contain executable
code that could be run on devices and they can’t thus change the
behavior of the Alexa-enabled device itself. Skills are merely third-
party-provided service extensions to AVS and can only react to
invocations, i.e. telling Alexa what to echo to the user in response
to specific requests to the Skill. The Lyexa attack framework uti-
lizes a specially-crafted malicious Skill to make Alexa speak to the
user what the adversary wants, mimicking the behavior of genuine
Skills or Alexa functionalities. The adversary can thereby exploit
the Alexa ecosystem for different attacks without ever having to
compromise the Alexa-enabled device itself.
Skills need to be registered in Amazon’s Skill repository, from
where users can activate them to be used. The activation of Skills
can happen through the Alexa app, webpage, or, using a voice
command. To be listed in the repository each Skill has to pass a
certification process in which Amazon tests the Skill to verify that
it works as specified. However, as the Skill is running on a remote
3https://www.gearbrain.com/which-cars-have-amazon-alexa-2525958778.html
4https://www.cnet.com/news/lg-instaview-thinq-alexa-fridge-clever-kitchen-tricks-
ces-2018/
5https://developer.amazon.com/alexa-skills-kit
6https://developers.google.com/actions/
server, AVS can’t control whether a Skill is modified after it has
passed the certification.
2.2 Inaudible Speech Injection
Recent attacks against virtual assistants by Song et al. [19] and
Zhang et al. [25] utilize the non-linearity of microphones beyond
the audible frequency spectrum to issue commands to a voice-
controlled virtual assistant that can’t be heard by the user. This is
achieved by exploiting physical characteristics of the microphones
typically used in such devices. By carefully injecting selected sig-
nals at high frequencies that lie beyond the hearing capacity of
humans, it is possible to create ’shadow’ signals in the microphone
within the audible frequency spectrum [14] and use this for issuing
inaudible commands. These works assume a malicious device in
proximity to the targeted Voice Assistant injecting the inaudible
audio signal. We think this to be a realistic assumption and adopt
the same adversarial scenario, assuming that the attacker is able
to inject signals into the victim’s audio environment. To show that
Skills can be used for attacks we realise the Lyexa attack where
we will take use of this inaudible command injection technique
together with inaudible jamming of user commands to redirect the
user interaction from the Skill the user intended to the adversary’s
malicious Skill as described below.
3 OUR ATTACK LYEXA
Our goal with the Lyexa attack is to show that even though the
functionality and interaction model of Skills is very limited, it is
possible to craft Skills with malicious functionality that can be used
to construct harmful attacks against users by utilizing compromised
IoT devices in the vicinity of the Alexa device for realizing the
attack. The Lyexa attack has been designed under the assumption
that the Alexa devices and the AVS ecosystem have no exploitable
vulnerabilities and that the traffic is properly secured (e.g., TLS,
no ARP spoofing). We think this to be a realistic assumption since
Amazon spends considerable resources in designing and testing
their devices and would also have the necessary means for quickly
updating or patching their devices in case security vulnerabilities
affecting them were to be found. With this attack we want to show
how the AVS ecosystem can be exploited using Skills for unintended
purposes without compromising individual components as such.
However, as recent numerous reports about IoT devices with
security vulnerabilities suggest, many IoT devices in the smart
homes of users can be exploited relatively easily by automated
security attacks like those performed by IoT malware likeMirai [2],
Hajime [7] or Persirai [22]. Especially devices like IP cameras seem
to be often affected by such attacks, as many of them can be easily
exploited due to insecure security configurations like easy-to-guess
administrator passwords.
3.1 Attack Overview
We developed and verified the Lyexa attack on Amazon’s AVS
ecosystem, as it is currently the most popular voice-controlled vir-
tual assistant platform for smart speakers. [11] However, as virtual
assistants are conceptually similar, our attack can likely be extended
also to other virtual assistants. A conceptual overview of the Lyexa
attack scenario is shown in Fig. 2. It involves a smart home userU ,
a voice-controlled virtual assistant device E like the Amazon Echo
connected to the Alexa Voice Service (AVS), a malicious IoT device
D and a malicious Skill S in the AVS ecosystem. The adversary is
a remote attacker controlling both malicious components S and
D and able to take use of a speech-to-text service or library STT ,
many of which are readily available.
Speech to
Text service /
library 
Malicious
Skill with
backend 
Malicious IoT
device
Alexa Voice 
Service (AVS)
D
STT
S
User (U) Amazon Echo (E) 
Adversary
Figure 2: Overview of the Lyexa attack, dotted lines repre-
sent a “can control” or “has access to” relation, solid lines
show that objects have a connection
3.1.1 Assumptions. The malicious IoT device D is located in the
vicinity of E (e.g., on the same living room table) and is equipped
with a microphone and a loudspeaker capable of emitting ultra-
sound signals. We will show in Sect. 5.2.1 that numerous different
kinds of entry-level IoT devices like IP cameras are equipped with
hardware that are likely to satisfy these requirements.
Device D is accompanied by a malicious Skill S under the control
of the adversary. This Skill has to be activated on the victim’s AVS
account. Note that since it is possible to enable Skills by voice7, it
is possible that device D could use inaudible speech injection as
described in Sect. 2.2 to activate Skill S by itself.
3.2 Attack Components
Our attacks consists of four distinct components, as depicted in
Fig. 3 and discussed below.
3.2.1 Command jamming. Figure 3(a) shows how commands is-
sued by userU are inaudibly jammed and simultaneously recorded
by malicious device D. When U speaks the wake word ("Alexa")
both the benign Alexa-enabled device E and malicious device D
are activated (1). Benign device E starts listening for subsequent
commands and D starts jamming this command with ultrasound
modulated noise, which is inaudible for humans as evaluated by
Roy et al. [14] (2). This way the command issued by U can’t be
understood by E. D simultaneously records the command.
3.2.2 Malicious Skill invocation. The second attack component is
depicted in Fig. 3(b). When user U finishes speaking the command
(1), D immediately stops jamming and inaudibly injects a Skill
invocation command with malicious Skill S’s invocation name to
E which is still listening for a command (2). E will forward the
injected audio command to AVS (3), which interprets it and invokes
malicious Skill S (4). Malicious Skill S is now started and can return
7https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201848700
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Figure 3: Depiction of the four attack components needed for the Man-in-the-Middle attack
arbitrary text to be echoed through E in Alexa’s voice. The inaudible
command injection is realized by utilizing the amplitudemodulation
technique discussed in Sect. 2.2.
3.2.3 Retrieving benign data from benign Skill. The purpose of the
third attack component is to fetch benign data from a benign Skill
that userU wanted to invoke with his command. This is shown in
Fig. 3(c). D first starts a new session with AVS and forwards U ’s
recorded command to it, just like a benign Alexa-enabled device
would do (1). AVS will then invoke the requested Skill and pass
the command to it (2). Subsequently, the benign Skill will return a
textual representation of the response to AVS (3) which will then
use the Alexa TTS engine to create a voice audio file out of it
and forward it to D (4). Now the malicious device D will send the
audio file containing the response to a STT service (5) for it to be
transcribed back into text (6). Now D knows what data the victim
wanted to fetch from the requested Skill.
3.2.4 Echoing modified data to user. The fourth component, de-
picted in Fig. 3(d), shows how modified data is finally echoed to
the victim user U . After arbitrarily modifying the response data
received from the benign Skill in the previous step (1), D passes
this text to the backend of Skill S (2). S then passes the received text
to the already established AVS session (3) which will then create
an audio file with the help of Alexa’s TTS engine. This audio file is
passed to E (4) to be played back to userU (5).
3.3 Hijacking Built-In Alexa Commands
The most straightforward attack variant aims at hijacking built-in
Alexa commands like “Alexa, will it rain today?” (i.e., commands
containing no Skill name, as shown in Fig. 4 segment 0). The com-
mand can be redirected to malicious Skill S by associating the
utterance “will it rain today” with an intent of Skill S , and letting
malicious IoT device D inject an inaudible voice command “using
Evil” (where Evil is the invocation name of Skill S) when the user
stops speaking to Alexa, as shown in Fig. 4 segment 1. This will
cause AVS to invoke Skill S using an intent corresponding to this
utterance. The malicious Skill S can then return any desired re-
Alexa, will it rain today?
} 
  utterance: "will it rain today", 
  skill: "evil" 
} 
} 
  utterance: null, 
  skill: "evil" 
} 
} 
  utterance: "will it rain today", 
  skill: null 
} 
0
1
2
Alexa, will it rain today?
, using Evil!
Alexa, ask X for Y!
<jamming>, start Evil!
Figure 4: Abstract representation of how injected voice com-
mands lead to different interpretations of the intended com-
mand. Segment 0 depicts a command activating a built-in
feature, segment 1 and 2 are depicting redirections to the
Skill “Evil”.
sponse to AVS, which will be echoed back to user U using Alexa
device E, thereby making the user believe he is talking to Alexa’s
built-in functionality and not to Skill S .
3.4 Skill Redirection Attack
One drawback of the above attack is that it can’t be used to redirect
commands that are targeted at a particular benign Skill. For example,
if the user wants to lock his smart lock front door with the help of
the Security Skill, he will issue the command “Alexa, ask Security
to lock the front door”. Just injecting the Skill S’s invocation name
after the command (“using Evil”) would not be sufficient, as the
resulting command heard by E would contain the invocation name
of two different Skills, resulting in AVS ignoring this command.
In order to redirect Skill invocations, we need to enhance the
attack by preventing Alexa from understanding the genuine Skill’s
invocation. The obvious way to achieve this is by deviceD injecting
inaudible noise, as depicted in Fig. 4 segment 2, at the same time the
user is speaking the command, essentially jamming the user’s input
so that Alexa will not be able to understand it (a similar jamming
attack, however not targeting voice assistants, has recently been
published independently to our work by Roy et al. [14]).
Our evaluation of jamming of user issued commands (cf.
Sect. 5.1.2) showed that to be effective, D needs to jam the user
command starting immediately after the wake-word, up until the
command is finished. This means D needs to start jamming even
before it can know which command the user is going to issue. To
still be able to provide meaningful responses to the user’s command
the malicious deviceD needs to independently record the command
of the user while simultaneously jamming it, as shown in Fig. 3(a).
This is feasible because different microphones are sensitive to dif-
ferent AM carrier wave frequencies. Device D’s microphone will
therefore not pick up the emitted inaudible jamming signal as it
is not sensitive to the same frequency as the microphone of the
targeted Alexa device. After recording the command, D uses the
speech-to-text service STT to convert the recorded audio to text
and forwards it to Skill S’s backend. After the user command has
been jammed,D executes the Malicious Skill invocation attack com-
ponent (Fig. 3(b)) by inaudibly injecting the redirection command
to invoke Skill S and cause AVS to start a session with it.
If the transcribed user command text returned by STT contains a
Skill name or utterance the adversary wants to hijack, the malicious
Skill S returns a reply to AVS to be played back to the user, as de-
picted in Fig. 3(d) (Echoing modified data to user component). This
essentially denies the user access to this Skill while simultaneously
making him think the response is coming from the genuine Skill.
However, if the user command does not contain Skill names or
utterances the adversary wants to hijack, it still needs to provide a
plausible response to the user in order to avoid the user realizing
that he is the victim of an attack. For realizing this the adversary
can utilize the benign functionality of the AVS by playing a Skill-
in-the-Middle attack as discussed below.
3.5 Skill-in-the-Middle Attack
In this variant of our attack the adversary stages a full man-in-
the-middle attack between the user and benign Alexa Skills. After
performing the Command jamming and Malicious Skill invocation
attack components as described above, device D will use the Re-
trieving benign data from benign Skill attack component as shown
in Fig. 3(c) over a separate session with AVS to get benign data from
the Skill that user U wanted to invoke. After obtaining the benign
data, device D can process it and modify it in any way it wants and
use the Echoing modified data to user attack component (Fig. 3(d))
to return a forged response to the user with the help of malicious
Skill S . The Skill-in-the-middle attack gives the adversary thus full
control over the conversation of the victim userU and any Alexa
functionalities, in particular, Skills.
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Figure 5: Components of the attack setup
The Skill-in-the-Middle attack is particularly devastating, as an
adversary can use it, e.g., to modify arbitrary responses of benign
Skills. For example by manipulating the responses of a Skill pro-
viding the latest quotes on share prices it can falsify the quotes of
particular companies’ stock in a way that may trick the victim into
making valuable financial transactions based on false information
with potentially far-reaching consequences.
Note that all attack variants presented above use Alexa’s genuine
voice and device (which the user typically trusts) to deliver the
modified or wrong information, giving the adversary the potential
to substantially mislead the user or fool him to take specific actions
as desired by the adversary.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
The overall design of our system is shown in Fig. 5. It consists of a
malicious IoT device D and Skill S . The Skill is implemented with
the help of a lambda function and a state server that are both under
control of the adversary. Our implementation also takes use of an
online speech-to-text service STT .
4.1 Malicious IoT Device
To evaluate our attack we constructed a prototype of a malicious
IoT device comprising following relatively inexpensive off-the-shelf
hardware components shown in Fig. 6: a Fostex FT17H wide-range
tweeter speaker8 (ca. US$ 70) connected to a YAMAHA R-S202D 9
amplifier (ca. US$ 200). With this setup we were able to produce
signals in the frequency range of 500Hz to 50 kHz. The amplifier
amplifies signals with frequencies up to 100 kHz without much
distortion (±3 dB), this makes it suitable for our purpose.
For recording sounds and measurements we used a MiniDSP
UMIK-110 microphone. To run the software we used a Lenovo
ThinkPad T43011 laptop. This laptop has a sound card (and drivers)
capable of generating signals with frequencies of up to 192 kHz.
8https://fostexinternational.com/docs/speaker_components/pdf/FT17H_rev3.pdf
9https://europe.yamaha.com/en/products/audio_visual/hifi_components/r-
s202d/index.html
10https://www.minidsp.com/products/acoustic-measurement/umik-1
11https://www3.lenovo.com/us/en/laptops/thinkpad/t-series/t430/
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Figure 6: Photo of the hardware setup mimicking the mali-
cious IoT device. The laptop is connected to the microphone
and the amplifier. The tweeter is connected to the amplifier
and aligned in the direction of the Amazon Echo Dot.
The malicious IoT device’s software consists of a hotword detec-
tion engine called Snowboy12, a library for communicating with
AVS and means to connect to the STT service. The Snowboy engine
was modified to also be able to save recorded audio, and return the
status of detection. With these modifications it is possible to start
the hotword detector with the pre-trained Alexa detection model,
which is shipped with Snowboy, and record audio after the hotword
is detected.
4.2 Malicious Skill
The malicious Skill S consists of two components: a state server
and lambda function realizing the functionality of the Skill.
4.2.1 Adversarial State Server. When the lambda function of Skill
S is invoked by AVS in a Skill redirection or Skill-in-the-middle
attack, it initially can’t know how to correctly react to the user
command, as the invocation name of the intended Skill and any
command parameters are jammed by D and thus not understood
by AVS. Device D needs therefore a way to notify S the hijacked
Skill’s name and possible command parameters. For this it uses S ’s
RESTful state server, which is continuously polled by S’s lambda
function. Device D uses POST instructions to store the instructions
of what Skill to mimic or what text to reply on the state server, from
where the lambda function will receive it by polling the state server.
Polling of the state server is performed by the lambda function
using GET requests once every second.
4.2.2 Adversarial Skill’s Backend Lambda Function. Skill S ’s lambda
function is implemented using alexa-sdk andNode.js onAWS Lambda13,
which is a fee-based Function as a Service (FaaS). AWS Lambda is
the platform recommended by Amazon for Skill backends. To get a
malicious Skill certified and into the official Alexa Skill store the
adversary has to create a functional and apparently benign Skill
that can pass the screening performed by Amazon. This needs to
12https://snowboy.kitt.ai/
13https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/features/
be done in a way that the Skill still provides a hidden entry point
for the adversary to trigger the malicious functionality after the
Skill has passed certification. This can be done either by directly
triggering a dedicated intent for the malicious functionality, or,
it can be activated when the issued command contains a specific
keyword as a command parameter.
Naturally, the utterance triggering a malicious intent should
be known only to the adversary, which means that it needs to be
hidden from regular users. This is, however, not difficult, as there
is no apparent way (as a normal user) to get a list of all utterances
a Skill can understand or react to. In the certification process only
three different commands have to be declared to be listed in the
official interface description of a Skill in Amazon’s Skill repository.
Any additional commands can be left ’invisible’ to regular users.
All commands and intents the Skill understands are tested by
Amazon during certification for their functionality, but after pass-
ing certification the adversary can change their behavior in its
backend system without having to re-certify the Skill. Similarly,
the adversary can change the behavior of an intent in its backend
in response to specific Slot values triggering malicious functional-
ity. Effectively, malicious Skill S will therefore have two handlers:
one for its public ’benign’ functionality and a second one realizing
malicious functionality. The second handler is triggered by the first
handler when it receives a malicious functionality-triggering intent
or a specific keyword value as a command parameter.
4.2.3 Malicious Skill’s InteractionModel. ASkill’s InteractionModel
is a mapping of the user’s input to intents, which are passed to the
Skill’s backend. The user’s input consists of utterances which can
include Slots. From the available Skill types14 we utilize so-called
Custom Skills for our attack since they provide the most flexible
invocation options and functionality. An example command to in-
voke a Custom Skill could be: “Alexa, ask Recipes how do I make an
omelet.” where Recipes is the invocation name and “how do I make
an omelet” is an utterance for the Recipes Skill to process15, 16.
Our malicious Skill’s Interaction Model is quite simple. There
are only four intents of which three provide benign functionality
and are publicly advertised as well as one malicious intent that is
not disclosed to users. This intent consists of a genuine looking
utterance and an utterance consisting solely of two Slots for which
we do not provide sample values. Normally a Slot would match ex-
actly one word (or more with provided samples), but this utterance
consisting of two times the same Slot separated by a space will
match any number of words. This way Alexa can be tricked into
passing S the full transcript of the user command as a Slot value
and match every possible sentence the user says (as we might not
know what the impersonated Skill wants the user to say).
4.2.4 Skill Certification. As stated in Sects. 2.1 and 4.2.2, malicious
Skill S needs to be certified to be listed in the Alexa Skill Store so
that it can be enabled on every Alexa-enabled device via companion
app or voice command. Our Skill S disguises itself as a Skill for
14https://developer.amazon.com/docs/ask-overviews/understanding-the-different-
types-of-skills.html
15https://developer.amazon.com/docs/custom-skills/understanding-how-users-
invoke-custom-skills.html
16https://developer.amazon.com/docs/custom-skills/understanding-custom-
skills.html
retrieving statistics about YouTube channels. It is called “YouTube
Statistics (Unofficial)” and it’s invocation name is “you statistics”.
We were able to get our Skill certified and added to the Store.
The benign functionality of Skill S returns statistics about
YouTube channels. It can be queried to return for a given chan-
nel name the number of subscribers, total number of views, the
title of the latest activity or the title of the latest playlist. We didn’t
disclose the corresponding utterance for querying playlist titles, so
this intent can be used for triggering the malicious functionality.
In addition, if an utterance with a Slot value “evil” is passed to the
skill, a state variable is set, which will cause the malicious handlers
to handle all intents instead of the handlers providing the benign
functionality.
We minimized the potential exposure of users to our malicious
Skill functionality by disabling listening for the utterance or Slot
value when no evaluation was done. In addition, the Skill was
available only briefly in the Skill store, as development work was
done using an unlisted development Skill. We are therefore certain
that no user enabled the malicious functionality.
4.3 Attack Signal Generation
We implemented the method for shifting voice samples of utter-
ances and the jamming sound into the ultrasonic spectrum with
MATLAB. The details of the used signal modulation are presented
in Appendices A and B. We used for low-pass filtering the Equirip-
ple single-rate FIR filter17 and we were able to automatically create
ultrasonic audio files with different carrier wave frequencies from
20 kHz to 40 kHz for evaluation purposes. We encoded the audio
files with the Free Lossless Audio Codec (FLAC), a lossless audio
format suitable for storing also ultrasonic frequencies.
Stealthiness improvements. With our initial setup a crackling/pop
sound could be heard when playback of the ultrasonic audio file
was started and stopped. We removed this unwanted noise with a
linear fade-in of 0.16ms corresponding to 30 samples at a sampling
rate of 192 kHz and a linear fade-out of one second (192000 samples)
applied on an added one second of silence to the original audio file.
As a result, the starting and ending of the ultrasound injection can’t
be heard as a clearly audible sound.
4.4 Putting it All Together
A user typically starts an interaction by uttering the wake-word
“Alexa”. When the wake-word is detected by the malicious IoT
device D, it immediately starts jamming the user’s subsequent
command by using a pre-recorded and modulated audio file with
a duration of > 7 seconds and consisting of sawtooth signal noise.
While D is jamming the user command, it also records it. This
is possible because D will not record its own jamming sound, as
the microphone of D is not sensitive to demodulating signals with
the same carrier wave frequency as the Alexa-enabled device’s
microphone. When the user stops speaking, D stops jamming and
inaudibly injects malicious Skill S’s invocation name from a pre-
recorded and modulated audio file.
To handle the recorded user command D sends it to a speech-to-
text Service STT which transcribes it and returns the most probable
17https://www.mathworks.com/help/signal/ref/equiripple.html
transcriptions as text. We are using the Bing Speech API18. If the
transcription contains a command or invocation name thatD wants
to hijack, it sends an instruction to the state server to mimic this
specific Skill and command. Otherwise D sends the recorded audio
to AVS. The AVS backend will then process the command and
return a JSON payload containing a Speak Directive with a binary
attachment containing MP3 encoded audio. To get the response in
textual form this audio has to be transcribed by STT as well. After
D gets the transcription its sends it as an instruction to the state
server telling S to return the transcribed audio text via AVS to the
user. If the genuine Skill expects a response from the user, the Skill’s
reply will prompt the user to provide this response. In this case D
will proceed to recording the user’s response, send it response to
STT for transcription, forward this to the genuine Skill through
AVS and, receive the response, transcribe it again through STT and
finally send the transcription as an instruction to S for playback to
the user. In this way the adversary is are able to conduct a complete
MITM attack on the user’s genuine Alexa-enabled device and the
requested genuine Skill.
5 EVALUATION
The evaluation of our attack was carried out in an isolated office
room measuring about 4 times 6 meters. The background noise was
around 50 dB. The ultrasonic speaker was placed about 30 cm above
an Amazon Echo Dot, our Alexa device, to avoid coupling effects.
5.1 Attack Components’ Performance
5.1.1 Adversarial Skill invocation. First we needed to find the car-
rier wave frequency on which Amazon Echo Dot demodulates the
strongest signal. We injected the command “start Evil”, where Evil
is our uncertified Skill’s invocation name. Our evaluation in App. C
shows that using carrier wave frequencies from 22 kHz to 23 kHz
provides the best performance in terms that AVS is able to optimally
understand the injected voice command.
5.1.2 What to jam. To test how AVS and the Alexa-enabled device
(e.g. Echo Dot) react to jamming, we used white noise to jam parts
of a command in order to find the best jamming strategy.
Setup. To evaluate what we have to jam and how AVS reacts to
it we used the (syntactically incorrect) command: “Alexa, Ask X
for Y, ask Evil for Z”, with the invocation names X and Evil and
utterances Y and Z. For testing purposes we used audible white
noise and added it to parts of the command audio sample recorded
from a male person. We experimented with jamming different parts
of the command in order to see which parts of the command needed
to be jammed to make AVS not understand the benign command
anymore and instead understand our injected command. The results
are shown in Tab. 1.
Jamming benign Skill name. Jamming the benign Skill’s invoca-
tion name “X”, resulted in the effective command “Alexa, Ask for
Y, ask Evil for Z”. AVS started “Z” unreliably (in < 50% of trials) if
it was also a built-in functionality like “tell me a joke”. If “Z” was
only an utterance for “Evil” we were not even able to make AVS
launch ”Evil” with the utterance “Z”.
18https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/speech/
Table 1: Results of jamming different parts of the command.
Part to jam Result
Only X Alexa starts unreliably Z if it is
also a built-in function
Ask and first part of X Alexa starts unreliably Evil with Z
Ask X for Y Alexa starts reliably Evil with Z
Command: “Alexa, Ask X for Y, ask Evil for Z”
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Figure 7: Results of jamming the voice sample “tell me a
joke” recorded from amale person, arrivingwith an air pres-
sure of 73 dB at the Amazon Echo Dot, with a sawtooth and
sine wave signal at 1000Hz, modulated with different carrier
waves, from 30 cm distance, at different volume levels (50-
60/100)
Jamming Ask and first part of X. We only jammed “Ask” and first
part of “X” leaving the recognizable part of the command as “for
Y, ask Evil for Z”. If the added noise was loud enough so that AVS
was not able to understand the jammed part correctly it interprets
it as “ask Evil for Z” unreliably (in < 50% of trials). This shows that
the leftover utterance “for Y” is still confusing AVS.
Jamming the whole benign command. Finally we added noise to
the complete benign command “Ask X for Y”. AVS was now able
to understand “ask Evil for Z” reliably, and therefore started our
malicious Skill (Evil) with the utterance “Z”.
Result. The results show that jamming has to start immediately
after the wake-word and last just until the inaudible command
injection starts (i.e., the entire benign command has to be jammed).
This means that jamming needs to start before the attacker knows
which command the user will issue, otherwise Alexa will recog-
nize the genuine Skill name and will ignore the redirection to the
malicious Skill S or will be confused by those parts of the benign
command that have not been jammed.
5.1.3 User command jamming. To evaluate command jamming,
we recorded a human male saying “tell me a joke”. This command
starts the built-in functionality of Alexa to tell a joke and therefore
should be easy for Alexa to understand correctly, because it uses
no arbitrary Skill names. This sample was played with a sound
pressure of 73 dB at the Echo Dot. We modulated a 1000Hz saw-
tooth and a 1000Hz sine wave signal with a carrier wave with a
frequency of 22 kHz and 23 kHz to induce a noise signal in Echo
Dot’s microphone. The results of jamming with 10 trials each are
shown in Fig. 7. At volume level 60 all signal types are able to
jam the voice sample successfully. The sawtooth signal was barely
audible whereas the sine wave-based signal was even less audible.
5.1.4 Attack performance. We evaluated injection and jamming
at a distance of 30 cm. The greater the distance between D and E,
the higher sound pressure [14, 25] is required. With our setup the
maximum distance for reliable injection and jamming we could
achieve was 140 cm between the ultrasonic speaker and Echo Dot
with a success rate of 100% at a volume level of 70/100 for injection
and 60% for jamming with 10 trials each.
We evaluated the Skill redirection attack on 10 “top skills” of
the US Alexa Skill store and two smart home security Skills “Nuki”
and “Homematic IP” in an isolated room. We invoked each Skill
using the 1-3 example utterances displayed on each Skill’s store
page. Every Skill was invoked 10 times by two different persons.
Each attack was executed as described in Sect. 4.4, i.e., by jamming
the user command after the wake-word and injecting a command
to invoke the malicious Skill after the user stopped speaking. This
results in an attack success rate of 75 %. Tab. 2 shows the percentage
of failure for each module (jamming, injection and STT). The most
prevalent reason for the attack to fail was due to a failure in the
injection of the malicious Skill’s invocation name. We observed that
even when the recorded audio of the injected invocation-name was
very good (the audio captured by AVS can be inspected through
the “history” tab in the Alexa Apps settings), AVS still sometimes
misheard the command, resulting in a failure to start the malicious
skill. Jamming and speech-to-text translation (STT) of the command
were almost always successful. An asterisk next to the STT value in
Tab. 2 indicates minor transcription errors (e.g. “new key” instead
of “Nuki”, or “jurassic park” instead of “jurassic bark”) which were
systematic and can therefore easily be corrected bymalicious device
D using an extended keyword list to capture desired utterances.
They were thus not counted as STT module failures.
We also tested how accurately Skills are triggered without ad-
versarial influence by invoking each Skill ten times, as described
above. In the benign setting the requested Skill was successfully
started with the correct command in 87 % of the trials. An invoca-
tion trial was considered successful, if the command was correctly
transcribed by AVS as displayed by the “history” tab in the Alexa
app and the correct Skill was started. As can be seen, the attack
deteriorates the accuracy of Alexa’s responses from a user point of
view, but only slightly (from 87 % to 75 %). It is therefore question-
able whether a user would be able to notice the presence of attacks
only based on the changed behavior of AVS.
To evaluate whether different room layouts or interiors affect
the attack we carried out tests in a conference room, different office
rooms with up to 6 persons in it and even a crowded exhibition hall.
We found no degradation of the attack success rate based on these
factors, however, a large enough background noise pressure like in
the crowded exhibition hall can cause our attack to fail (when the
injected command sound level is less than the background noise
Table 2: Results of attacking the 10 “top skills” from the US
Skill store (Nov. 2018) and two smart home security Skills,
using example commands (1-3) listed on the store page
Skill Name Jamming Injection STT
Flash Briefing Skills
Reuters TV (U.S.) 7 % 10 % 0 %*
Fox News
NPR News Now
Custom Skills
Jeopardy! 5 % 0 % 15 %
Find My Phone 0 % 22 % 6 %
Jurassic Bark 0 % 22 % 0 %*
Question of the Day 0 % 15 % 0 %*
Sleep Sounds:
Ocean Sounds 5 % 20 % 0 %
Sleep Sounds:
White Noise 25 % 25 % 0 %*
Sleep and Relaxation
Sounds 0 % 11 % 6 %
Nuki 5 % 20 % 0 %*
Smart Home Skills
Homematic IP 0 % 15 % 5 %*
level) but such noise levels are not common in private homes where
Alexa devices are typically deployed.
5.2 Proof-of-Concept Attack
We implemented two proof-of-concept implementations of our at-
tack for two Alexa-controlled smart-home devices, the Homematic
IP Security System 19 and the Nuki smart lock20. Both security
Skills can be activated or locked through Alexa. The goal of the at-
tack is to prevent the user from locking his smart lock or arming of
the smart home security system while simultaneously leaving him
believing Alexa has armed or locked it properly. The Homematic
IP Security System uses a Smart Home Skill for arming the home
security system. When the Skill-redirection attack is run and the
user says “Turn on absence mode”, the command is redirected to
the malicious Skill which will return a reply that is identical with
that of the benign Skill, requesting further information on what
device is to be armed: “Sorry what device?”. The user can reply to
this anything, the malicious Skill will always just return “Okay.”
without notifying or contacting the genuine Skill at any stage. The
result of the attack is that the security system remains disarmed,
even though the user thinks it is armed, because the exact same
wording is used by the malicious Skill than what the genuine Skill
would use. The Nuki Smart Lock uses a Custom Skill. If a user wants
to close a lock and says “Ask Nuki to lock front door.”, where front
door is the name of the lock to be locked, the malicious Skill will
directly return “Smart lock front door is locking.”, again using a
wording that is identical with the benign Skill’s reply.
19https://www.homematic-ip.com/
20https://nuki.io/en/smart-lock/
In a Skill-in-the-middle scenario if the user wants to hear recent
stock prices for a company using a popular stock market Skill called
Stock Prices by Opening Bell21 and asks “Ask Opening Bell for the
price of Amazon”, malicious device D forwards this command to
Alexa’s backend, and gets a response which is formed like “Amazon
is trading at 1599.01. Down 1.97%.”. Device D can modify these
values at will and return this forged response with the help of
malicious Skill S . Again the adversary used the exact wording of
the genuine Skill to make the user believe the provided information
is real because it comes from his trusted stock Skill.
5.2.1 Feasibility on IoT Hardware. To evaluate the susceptibility
of smart home devices to the Lyexa attack, we examined its feasi-
blity given the typical hardware set-up of IoT devices. The used
malicious device could be a cheap two-way security camera like
the Apexis J011-WS. The J011-WS is equipped with a generic 1W,
8Ω small loudspeaker and the Cirrus WM8731 driver22, which is
able to process PCM audio with a sampling rate of up to 96 kHz.
We tested the speaker and were able to inaudibly inject commands
into the Echo Dot from a distance of up to ≈ 30 cm and inaudibly
jam commands from up to ≈ 15 cm, with an AM carrier frequency
of up to 25 kHz even though the speaker is not rated for frequen-
cies beyond 20 kHz (this is the maximum we could safely achieve
without overheating the speaker, for a one time attack, even more
power could be used to extend the range of attack). We also tested
a 3W and 2W generic small form factor non-tweeter speaker sold
for less than $5. We were able to successfully perform command
injection at a distance of up to 45 cm and 40 cm and jam at up to
30 cm and 20 cm, respectively. This shows that no special hardware
is needed to accomplish this attack and even cheap off the shelf IoT
devices can be used.
Cheap IP cameras, including devices from Apexis, are reported
to be vulnerable to many attacks. This (generic) IP camera family is
branded by bigger companies like Logilink, which sells the model
WC0030A23. Remote code execution vulnerabilities for 1250 dif-
ferent camera models, including brandings of this generic camera
model (Apexis, Logilink, etc.) were published24. In addition to that
our model automatically gets a public hostname on power on which
also suffers from an enumeration vulnerability.
All this combined could enable an attacker to enumerate devices,
access them remotely and upload a malicious firmware or ultrasonic
modulated audio files to the devices to attack Alexa devices in vicin-
ity. This shows that many devices, even without special hardware
like a tweeter speaker may be used remotely by an attacker to emit
ultrasonic frequencies and attack other devices.
6 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge there are no published man-in-the-
middle attacks against Virtual Personal Assistants like Amazon
Alexa, especially attacks utilizing service plug-ins like Skills. We
are also not aware of approaches combining both jamming and in-
jecting of inaudible commands to implement more complex attacks.
21https://www.amazon.com/Stock-Prices-by-Opening-Bell/dp/B01E9Z3UVC
22https://www.cirrus.com/products/wm8731/
23http://www.logilink.com/WLAN_Indoor_Pan-Tilt_IP_Kamera_mit_Nachtsicht-
Bewegungsmelder_2-Way_Audio.htm
24https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Mar/23
We focus therefore on reviewing existing approaches that aim at is-
suing commands to Virtual Private Assistants without victim users
noticing.
Audible Synthesized Voice Commands. Diao et al. [6] discuss at-
tacks against the Google Voice Search (GVS) app on Android smart
phones. To carry out these attacks, a malicious appmust be installed
on the device. The malicious app activates GVS and simultaneously
plays a recorded or synthesized command over the built-in speakers
which is then picked up by the microphone, on which GVS is lis-
tening. This way the malicious app can access restricted resources
by using GVS without asking the user for permission. The app
can also call the attacker through GVS, enabling the attacker to
issue commands via the call. This attack, however, does not work
anymore on Android 7, as it uses now voice cancellation techniques
to improve voice calls by reducing recorded noise. Alepis et al. [1]
therefore extend the work of Diao et al. [6] by proposing to use
multiple devices to perform the attack and to use Firebase to return
transcribed audio replies.
These attacks only work on Android smart phones and are lim-
ited to injecting commands when the victim user is not listening.
It is therefore not applicable in our scenario. Nevertheless we uti-
lize the idea of using synthesized audio to control Virtual Private
Assistants and that the (synthesized speech) answer can be reli-
ably transcribed back into text, essentially allowing us to flexibly
interact with a voice-controlled assistant via text.
Audible Mangled Voice Commands. Vaidya et al. [21] propose
a method to mangle human voice so that it is no longer human
comprehensible but still recognizable by the Voice Recognition
Systems. The audio mangler takes raw voice and MFCC parameters
as input and returns mangled voice which is hard for humans to
understand but Voice Recognition Systems detect the same text in
this mangled audio as in the raw audio.
Carlini et al. [3] extended the work of Vaidya et al. [21]. In ad-
dition to the black box approach Carlini et al. evaluate a white
box approach against the open-source CMU Sphinx where the un-
derlying mechanics are known to the attacker. Because the inner
workings of CMU Sphinx are known, a more precise attack is pos-
sible. Our attack does not use command mangling for injecting or
jamming because if the attack is repeated several times this would
raise the suspicions of the victim as the mangled sounds would
always need to occur at the same time he interacts with Alexa.
Inaudible Voice Commands. Song et al. [19] describe an attack
using the non-linearity of microphones to induce low frequency
sounds with the use of ultrasonic frequencies in microphones
of voice-controlled virtual assistants (cf. Sect 2.2). Independently
Zhang et al. [25] evaluated the demodulation properties of MEMS
and ECM microphones for a single modulated frequency and voice,
which consists of multiple frequencies. We adopted techniques in
these papers for realizing command injection performed by mali-
cious device D and combining it with inaudible command jamming
to realize a complete attack framework against the Alexa virtual as-
sistant. In contrast to their attack that is limited to simple command
injection, our attack framework allows to hijack the entire inter-
action between user and Alexa or Skills allowing for much more
powerful attack scenarios than mere issuing of single commands.
Independently to our work Roy et al. [14] have developed an
approach for realizing jamming of spy microphones using ultra-
sound signals while not interfering with human conversations. Our
method builds on similar findings than what also they report.
Voice Commands over the headset jack. Kasmi et al. [10] were
able to induce voice into a headset connected to a smart phone
using intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) and control
the listening Virtual Personal Voice Assistant this way. Another
attack requiring physical access to devices is described by Young
et al. [23]. The attack uses a RaspberryPi 2 with an audio board,
which is connected to the victim’s device over the headphone jack
to activate various functions on the smartphone. However, since the
typical virtual assistants targeted by our attack are not equipped
with headphone jacks, we did not consider these approaches in
constructing our attack framework.
Skill Squatting. Kumar et al. [12] identified utterances that the
Alexa STT engine misinterprets systematically and created an at-
tack, dubbed Skill Squatting utilizing these misinterpretations to
trick the user to open a malicious Skill. Zhang et al. [26] attack uses
Skills with a similar pronounced or paraphrased invocation-name
to hijack the command meant for that Skill. They do however not
elaborate on how their attack would work in practice, as for it to
be effective, e.g., for Skills requiring pairing to a device, both the
benign and the malicious Skills would need to be activated on the
victim’s Alexa account (the malicious after the benign Skill was
paired). Note that these kinds of attacks can only be used to redirect
the command flow to a different Skill, but not a full man-in-the-
middle attack, where communications between users and benign
Skills are modified on-the-fly, like Lyexa does.
Hide commands in other audio. Schönherr et al. [16] and Yuan
et al. [24] describe a method for hiding commands recognizable by
deep neural network-based voice recognition algorithms but not
by humans inside other audio files. Carlini et al. [4] showed how to
create an audio file with a similar waveformwhich transcribes into a
totally different sentence when processed by Mozilla’s DeepSpeech.
IoT attacks. Fernandes et al. [8] did a security analysis of the
smart home framework for Samsung’s SmartThings which allows
third parties to write apps for this service. Ho et al. [9] reviewed the
security of smart home locks against physically-present attackers
and relay attacks. Our attack differs from these works in that it does
not attack IoT devices directly, but achieves malicious functionality
through weaknesses in the AVS Skill ecosystem.
Other audio based attacks. Numerous works have used audio-
based components as parts of security attacks similar to our ap-
proach. Son et al. [18] used sound played at the resonance fre-
quency of MEMS gyroscopes to crash drones. Trippel et al. [20]
used an acoustic injection attack to control the output of a MEMS
gyroscope which made them able to inject fake steps into a Fitbit.
Cisse et al. [5] published an approach on how to create malicious
(perturbed) inputs for image classification and speech recognition.
Finally, Schlegel et al. [15] created a low-permission Android app
that can extract PINs and passwords from phone calls.
7 COUNTERMEASURES
Our attack is enabled by the non-linearity of microphones used in
Amazon Echo and other Voice Assistant devices and loopholes in
the Skill model. In this section we will discuss countermeasures
against both vulnerabilities.
Non-linearity. An effective countermeasure to defend against
Lyexa would be to change the hardware of microphones to not
pick up ultrasonic frequencies or to implement a hardware module
between amplifier and LPF to detect AM signals and silence the
baseband of the demodulated signal, to suppress the demodulated
voice commands. Furthermore, using machine-learning classifiers
can be used to distinguish between demodulated and normally
recorded audio. However, realizing such defenses in already de-
ployed devices is not feasible. For new devices, this would also
imply significant changes in device and in particular microphone
designs, making it unlikely to be adopted in the near future. A fea-
sible option could therefore be to resort to a dedicated device that
would monitor the audio environment and alarm the user or AVS
or even jam the injection, if it detects an abnormally high sound
pressure in the ultrasonic sound spectrum. After-market solutions
like this are not uncommon as similar products for securing the
home network25, 26 are emerging.
Skill model. Our attack works because Alexa continues to listen
even when it hears only noise. Alexa’s logic could therefore be
changed to ignore commands that are issued after extremely loud
noise in order to prevent jamming of commands. In addition, Alexa
could audibly announce which Skill is activated. This would allow
users to notice if an unintended Skill is invoked.
The recommended way of running a Skills backend is to use
the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Lambda service which is called
directly by AVS when a user invokes the Skill. Amazon could force
Skill developers to use Lambda and certify also the Skills’ back-
end source code to make sure the Skill backend doesn’t contain
malicious functionality. As Lambda is under control of Amazon,
it could require re-certification when the source code on Lambda
is changed, essentially preventing post-certification code changes.
While this countermeasure may not be feasible (e.g. increased cost
of certification, developers are limited in possibilities) it could be
used to prevent backdoors in Skills.
8 DISCUSSION
Note that the attacks described above are not achievable by previous
attack approaches that only inject commands (e.g. Dolphin [25],
which records voice and replays it inaudibly) as the invoked Skill
will return an audio reply which the user will be able to hear and
which will make him suspicious. Without the use of a malicious
Skill it is not possible to return modified or false information to the
user. Skill Squatting attacks [12, 26] could in principle be used to
realize our Skill redirection attack, but have a significant practical
obstacle. To hijack an interaction with a specific Skill the adversary
would need to bring the user to activate the malicious Skill with an
invocation name that is similar to the benign one in addition to the
already used Skill, which is unlikely.
25https://www.bitdefender.com/box/
26https://www.f-secure.com/en_US/web/home_us/sense
Using our man-in-the-middle attack it is also possible to realize
attacks requiring explicit entry of passwords or PIN codes, as the
user can be fooled to reveal these during the interaction with the
attacked virtual assistant. Previous approaches utilizing only clan-
destine command injection will not be able to do this, as these are
not known to the adversary.
In the Alexa companion app there are two lists where a user
can see the history of commands issued to Alexa, possily revealing
the attack to the user. The first is the main window, where all
previous ’home cards’ issued by Skills are listed. Issuing home
cards is, however not mandatory for Skills, so that the malicious
Skill can simply omit issuing home cards for malicious functionality.
The second is the “true” history of commands, which is located
on a third submenu level among all other companion app settings,
making it unlikely that regular users would actively monitor it.
Loud background noise or drastic changes in background noise
intensity can lead to unsuccessful command injections. However,
this does not impact the effectiveness of the attack in the most
common deployment environments of virtual assistants, which is
at home. There the environment is mostly silent, making the setting
favorable for our attack.
There may finally be commands we cannot successfully hijack
without the user noticing it. An example could be an interaction like
“Alexa, close my last used lock!” where Alexa would respond with
“Okay, your lock front door is now locked.”.Without the information
which lock was locked last, the adversary cannot reliably return
a satisfying response to this command. Getting this information
from Alexa is also not possible, as using the command would have
the side effect of closing the lock.
9 FUTUREWORK
To be able to attack a victim’s device reliably without a manual
setup, our malicious device has to be able to set up and calibrate
itself automatically, according to the physical characteristics of the
targeted victim device. There are different Amazon Echo variants
(Dot, Echo, Echo Plus) and two different generations of these devices.
Even two identically looking devices of the same generation and
version could use different microphone hardware. In addition to
that, the distance between the two devices requires a signal of
specific volume level to be used. If it is too low, no demodulation
of the signal is possible. If it is too high, we jam the microphone
by suppressing (quieter) voice by the automatic gain control [14],
instead of injecting voice. To adjust the correct volume level it is
possible to play, e.g., the Alexa wake-word at different volumes and
modulated with different carrier frequencies until the recognition
audio cue is played by the Echo device, indicating that the injection
is working.
Even though we eliminated the crackling sound when an ultra-
sonic audio file starts playing or ends, we still get a slightly audible
crack if we stop playing it halfway through. This happens when the
jamming audio stops abruptly because the injection audio has to be
played.We could use a pure tweeter speaker instead of a wide-range
one, to get rid of the crackling sound. A software approach (a one
second fade out) could be too long and Alexa might stop listening.
We could use also modify the attack to use Alexa itself as the STT
service. If we have an utterance consisting solely of slots (which
are able to catch everything) and a user says e.g. “Alexa, ask Nuki
to lock garden door” we could jam only “ask Nuki” and append “,
using Evil”. “to lock garden door” will then be transcribed by Alexa
and passed to our Skill’s backend as the Slot value. Drawbacks are
that we don’t know exactly which Skill the user wanted to invoke
(we could guess it from the rest of the command) and would need
a very precise way to jam only the correct part of the command.
In this case we wouldn’t need to record the user’s command and
transcribe it using a third party service.
Currently we are looking into Google Assistant and its Actions.
Samsung’s Bixby and Apple’s Siri have at the time of writing no
comparable add-on functionality like Alexa.
10 SUMMARY
We presented and evaluated the Lyin’ Alexa attack. We showed that
with this attack it is possible to completely hijack a full conversation
between Alexa and the user while simultaneously maintaining the
interaction semantics from the point of view of the user. We were
able to deny access to Skills or built-in functionality of Alexa and
return false but plausible looking data to the user in the name of
Alexa. Furthermore we suggest countermeasures and limitations of
this attack as well as possible modifications as future work.
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Figure 8: Results of injecting the voice sample “start Evil” recorded from a male human, modulated with different carrier
waves and at different volumes (45-55/100), into an Amazon Echo Dot from 30 cm distance.
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Figure 9: Results of injecting the voice sample “start Evil”
generated by a female voice TTS service,modulatedwith dif-
ferent carrier waves, into an Amazon Echo Dot from 30 cm
distance.
APPENDIX
A CRAFTING INAUDIBLE VOICE SIGNALS
The non-linearity of the transducer (the system consisting of a
microphone, amplifier, LPF and analog-digital converter (ADC)) will
output a signal consisting of more terms as the input. If Sin is the
input signal transported over the air (voice, music, single frequency
e.g. cos(2π f t)), the recorded signal, due to the non-linearity, would
be:
Sout =
i=1∑
∞
GiS
i
in = G1Sin +G2S
2
in + · · · (1)
whereGi is the gain for each term (GiSiin ), decreasing rapidly with
increasing i . The attack uses the demodulation properties of the
second term (the most powerful except the linear term). First we
need to low-pass filter our audio signal at 8kHz. Voice is mainly con-
centrated on the lower frequencies and therefore we can remove all
frequencies above 8kHz. This way our frequency spectrum reaches
from 0 − 8kHz. After that we need to upsample it to be able to con-
vert it to ultrasound (> 20kHz) later on. The upsampling frequency
should be the maximum frequency our device can process but no
less than 56kHz. We denote this signal as Sup .
The next step is to amplitude modulate it onto an ultrasonic
carrier wave with frequency fc to shift the signal into the ultrasonic
spectrum and make it inaudible for humans. We get:
Smodu = n1Supcos(2π fc t) (2)
where n1 is a normalization factor. This will create sidebands rang-
ing from fc − 8kHz to fc + 8kHz. This is why we need at least an
upsampling frequency of 58kHz. Given the Nyquist-Shannon sam-
pling theorem [17] we are able to sample a signal with a frequency
of up to 28kHz without loss using a sampling rate of 56kHz. With
the lower sideband ranging down to fc − 8kHz fc should be at least
28kHz to make it inaudible. After that we need to add the carrier
wave to the signal, so it can be demodulated by the non-linearity
of the speaker. We get:
Sadded = n2(Smodu + cos(2π fc t)) (3)
where n2 is another normalization factor.
Suppose Sm = cos(2π fmt) then the attack signal would be:
Sin = n2(n1cos(2π fmt)cos(2π fc t) + cos(2π fc t)) (4)
After demodulation we get the frequency components fm , 2(fc −
fm ), 2(fc + fm ), 2fc , 2fm , 2fc − fm and 2fc + fm . Every component
is above 20kHz and will be removed by the LPF of the microphone
except fm which is 8kHz at the maximum. That way the original
Sm is perceived by the microphone without ever played and thus
inaudible for humans.
B ATTACK SIGNAL PARAMETERS
The ultrasonic attack description of Song et al. [19] and Zhang et
al. [25] leaves many implementation and parameterization ques-
tions open. To craft the ultrasonic signal, we have to normalize it
with the variables n1 and n2, as described in Sect. A. Obviously we
cannot set them to 1 otherwise we will get our signal clipped at the
maximum amplitude of 1. We have to scale one or both amplitudes
down. Fortunately we don’t have to evaluate it but we can calculate
it easily as follows:
Applying Eq. 4 to Eq. 1 to calculate the second term of Sout
which we denominate Sout2 , we get:
Sout2 = G2
1
8 (n
2
2n
2
1cos(4π fc t − 4π fmt)
+n22n
2
1cos(4π fc t + 4π fmt) + 2n22n21cos(4π fc t)
+2n22n
2
1cos(4π fmt) + 2n22n21 + 4n22n1cos(4π fc t − 2π fmt)
+4n22n1cos(4π fc t + 2π fmt) + 8n22n1cos(2π fmt)
+4n22cos(4π fc t) + 4n22)
(5)
With this we we see that if we want to maximize the amplitude of
the demodulated Sm we have to maximize n22n1 while the maximum
possible amplitude of Sin is 1 to avoid clipping of the constructed
signal. Suppose Sm has an amplitude of 1 like the carrier wave and
the added wave. With Eq. 3 we get that the amplitude of Sin is
n2(n1 + 1). We have to find n1 and n2 of:
max
{
n1n
2
2 |(n1 + 1)n2 = 1
}
(6)
which is at (n1,n2) = (1, 12 ).
C EVALUATION OF PARAMETERS
The Echo Dot was activated by unmuting it by pressing the button
on top of the device, after which the modulated recording of a male
person saying “start Evil” was played back at different volumes and
modulated with different carrier waves of different frequencies. The
results are displayed in Fig. 8. We see that lower sound pressure
signals modulated with a lower frequency are successfully demod-
ulated. Unsuccessful injections usually mean that Alexa does not
understand anything, but it occasionally also understood “Even”,
“Not”, “Not you” and only “Evil”, as reported by the Alexa App. As
stated earlier this can be mitigated by using an invocation word
composed of two words which do not occur anywhere else. Evalu-
ating with the same setup but using a voice sample generated by a
female TTS service is depicted in Fig. 9. Song et al. [19] came to the
same conclusion, that this yields much worse results, as the female
voice is centered much higher than that of a male and is clipped by
the low-pass filter.
